斗鸡博弈的英文

• chicken game

• "斗鸡"英文翻译    game fowl; gamecock cockfigh ...
• "斗鸡" 英文翻译 :    1.game fowl; gamecock2.cockfighting
• "博弈" 英文翻译 :    gambling; game playing
• "斗鸡；猎鸟。" 英文翻译 :    game fowl
• "斗鸡场" 英文翻译 :    cockpit
• "斗鸡的" 英文翻译 :    cockfighting
• "斗鸡峰" 英文翻译 :    cockpit
• "斗鸡眼" 英文翻译 :    (斗眼) cross-eye
• "新斗鸡" 英文翻译 :    modern game; moderngame
• "雄斗鸡" 英文翻译 :    game cock
• "博弈机" 英文翻译 :    game machine; gaming machine
• "博弈解" 英文翻译 :    solution of game
• "博弈论" 英文翻译 :    game theory; gametheory; theory of game
• "博弈树" 英文翻译 :    game theory; game tree
• "博弈图" 英文翻译 :    game graph
• "博弈者" 英文翻译 :    gamer
• "大博弈" 英文翻译 :    the great game
• "零博弈" 英文翻译 :    zero game
• "斗鸡的人" 英文翻译 :    cocker
• "斗鸡等等" 英文翻译 :    art of cock fighting, quail fighting and ram fighting
• "斗鸡眼的" 英文翻译 :    cockeyed
• "斗鸡走狗" 英文翻译 :    enjoy cockfights and dogracing; cock-fights and dog-racing; vulgar games
• "斗鸡走马" 英文翻译 :    (to pass one's time) in cockfighting and horse racing
• "宫廷斗鸡" 英文翻译 :    cockfight in palace
• "印度斗鸡" 英文翻译 :    indian game

• Due to the difference of payoff matrix , the game relation between government and developers appears to be three game models , namely chicken game , prisoners ' dilemma and boxed pigs
  政府与开发商之间的博弈关系因支付矩阵的不同可能出现斗鸡博弈、囚徒困境博弈和智猪博弈三种情况。
• The author believes that the cooperative bidding model of power generation company is likely to be a prisoners " dilemma game , or be a chicken game , or be a boxed pigs game . the type of game lies on the cap of mcp and the costs difference among the generation companies
  认为在静态博弈中发电公司的合作有可能是一个囚徒困境博弈或斗鸡博弈，也可能是一个智猪博弈，主要取决于发电公司成本之间的差异以及市场的最高报价限制。
• Institutional investor is a market part who is developping and extending , with the expanding of it ' s scale , it wil become from shareholder negativism to institutional shareholder activism , however , between the institutional investors , another problem exists , that is , who is responsible for supervision , a cock game model which describes the supervision of institutional investors is used in this chapter to inspect the institutional investors " behaviour mode in the situation of supervising cost and return is not symmetric
  机构投资者是一个正在发展和壮大的主体，随着其规模的扩大，会从早先的股东消极主义发展到股东积极主义，但是，机构投资者之间也存在谁去监督的问题，为此，本章采用了一个机构投资者监督侵权行为的斗鸡博弈模型，来考察监督的成本和收益的不对称情况下的机构投资者行为模式。